I. Introduction
This paper explores the effect of social capital on the cost of financial capital. Specifically, it emphasizes and empirically explores the importance of similarity in the values and beliefs held by transacting agents in the reduction of the cost of external finance. Similarity among transacting agents and thus familiarity with their convictions regarding social norms and responsibility (Huberman 2001) 1 , -shared understanding‖ in Putnam's, (1993) terminology, facilitates interpretation of signals thereby contributing to trustworthiness in financial markets and reduces frictions inherent among contracting parties in debt financing (Aghion and Bolton 1992) . This is important given that the necessary information that underpins financial contracting is still largely soft, tacit, difficult to codify, interpret or transmitted at arm's-length and thus -many important commitments in financial markets are made outside the formal law, using institutional mechanisms that provide a plausible basis for commitment‖ (Morrison 2010) .
Banks specialize in information production, which they use to screen and monitor borrowers.
However, -little is known about the procedures and processes through which banks price credit. In particular, even after one takes into account the differences in borrowers, lenders, and markets, loan rates still often exhibit substantial dispersion‖ (Cerqueiro et al. 2007 ). This suggests that banks price loans in a discretionary manner which we try to explore empirically appealing to the notion of social capital formed by shared similar values and norms as manifested by the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 2 and as defined by Akerloff (1980) as an act whose utility to the performing agent depends on the beliefs and actions of other group members. Thus, the interaction among transacting agents characterized by high degree of familiarity is a major source and mechanism for the creation of the stock of social capital which we empirically show to affect the cost of financial capital.
1 Huberman (2001) shows that lack of familiarity limits investment and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that investors prefer to hold equity of firms of similar cultural origins. 2 To be defined below.
Several studies have examined how different components of social capital affect contractual provisions in loan finance and have found that agents are less likely to fund entrepreneurs in countries in which their citizens have lower trust levels among themselves (Bottazzi et al. 2009) 3 , or where lending is plagued with discrimination for reasons unrelated to project risk (Alesina et al. 2008 ). La Porta et al. (1997) , discuss behavior motivated by religious beliefs and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) ; Glaeser et al. (2000) ; Guiso et al. (2009) ; Mobius and Szeidl (2007) all attend to issues involving extra-legal agreements based on cultural, ethnic, racial or social similarities and ties (Hwang and Kim 2009 ) between contracting parties. Cohen et al. (2010) focus on shared education networks which facilitate information dissemination through agents in financial markets thus affecting security prices and Hong et al. (2004) discuss prosocial behavior effects on market participation. 4 An earlier study (Greif 1994) points to the extra-legal agreements and their support of a much wider scale of trade when they are enforced by social networks whose members are reliant upon their reputation within the network for future business.
At a rather aggregate level, Knack and Keefer (1997) have presented evidence indicating the positive influence of social capital on aggregate economic outcomes. Guiso et al. (2009) have shown that social capital, as measured by the similarities in culture's norms and beliefs among European citizens, determines bilateral trade, investment, and financial flows among countries. These studies mostly attend to issues concerning market participation or stock holdings but not directly to the cost of capital which is one of the unattended issues we are exploring in the present paper.
Superior matching among agents along the social norm dimension enhances familiarity and the set of mutual beliefs and values which reduces information asymmetries and facilitates cooperation.
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The amelioration of frictions can have profound implications for a firm's financing cost, capital 3 Bottazzi et al. (2009) use the term -Generalized trust‖ which pertains to -the preconceptions that people of one identifiable group have for people from another identifiable group so that the concern is with what might be considered cursory beliefs, generalizations about others, even stereotypes‖. 4 Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) have recently provided evidence to for the effects of social norms on markets by studying -sin‖ stocks. In particular, they show that norms affect stock prices, returns and holdings. 5 Glaeser et al. (2000) show that trust is higher among agents who are closer socially.
structure, investment policy and regulatory design which intends to safeguard against outcomes generated by agents who fail to internalize socially important effects of their actions.
An important property theoretically derived by Tabellini (2008) shows that the range of benefits from cooperation increases with the increase in the share of good firms belonging to same group. Moreover, based on Bisin et al. (2004) , Tabellini's (2008) model creates a strategic complementarity between norms and behavior that facilitates contracting difficulties propagated by asymmetric information. Tabellini (2008) makes a further distinction between limited vs. generalized morality, namely between norms of conduct that apply in a narrow or in a large set of social interactions which we explore empirically. In the present paper, the generalized morality is the group of firms that are ranked by a rating consortium reflecting features of social responsibility required in order to be admitted to the group, whereas the limited morality applies to a smaller (subset) group of firms with above average standards of social responsibility within the aforementioned generalized morality set of firms.
In this paper we investigate whether loan rates/spreads are affected by borrowers' social responsibility and particularly so by their proximity to lenders' social responsible stance. Our analysis clearly indicates that higher score of borrower social responsibility is associated with lower loan spread. Moreover and perhaps more importantly, we find that the aforementioned reduction in spreads is further enhanced when both lenders and borrowers belong to the aforementioned Tabellini's (2008) limited morality group (agents with larger values of the social responsibility score distribution).
Social responsibility refers to actions that -appear to further some social good, beyond which is required by law‖ (McWilliams and Siegel 2001) , and describes a business philosophy under which firms behave honestly with its various stakeholders, don't lie, cheat, or steal from them, and honor their commitments (Jones 1995) . By avoiding opportunism, firms signal their trustworthiness.
Moreover, companies voluntarily reporting their social responsibility credibly commit themselves to act in the best interests of their constituents and may benefit from lower costs of equity and debt capital, labor, and other inputs and from a higher value of their products or services to clients (Becht et al. 2003 lenders and borrowers provides superior debt financing conditions. 9 Additionally, the results reported in the present paper withstand a battery of robustness tests including potential endogeneity and sample selection biases in addition to various estimation methods, parametric as well as nonparametric. Furthermore, a robustness test indicates that our results stem from a reduction in the severity of asymmetric information rather than from a strategic behavior of banks trying to gain market share.
The present research contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, this study is one of the few to test the relationship between social capital and the cost of debt financing thereby complementing the findings pertaining to participation in financial markets. Second, our study is, to the least of our knowledge, the only one to use the concept of social responsibility for both partners to the financial contract and examines peer effects. The inclusion of both sides of the financial relationship allows examining the complementary effect on loan spreads of matching both social responsible borrowers and lenders. Group homogeneity along the social norm domain is the 8 Sustainalytics incorporates between 60 and 100 indicators, weighted according to the industry in which they are operating. These include a broad range of core and industry-specific indicators and assessment of companies' involvement in controversies and questionable incidents. (http://sustainalytics.com).
9 Our results give support to recent findings pertaining to corporate governance (Chhaochharia and Laeven 2009) providing a link between corporate governance and firm valuation (Tobin's Q) to show that firm-specific corporate governance practices which are set above the minimum legal requirements enable access to external funds on better terms, which contributes to firm valuation despite the associated costs. The mechanism at play is of a signaling device ensuring prospective investors that firms are well governed and which could also act as a bonding device, where firms commit to investors to adhere to better governance standards.
mechanism which facilitates the role of transforming soft information into hard information thereby facilitating and lowering the cost of trade, a theoretical notion emphasized and elaborated on by Caillaud and Tirole (2007) . 10 Such approach allows for the extension and improvement on the related literature that analyzes the influence of cultural, ethnic, racial or social similarities between parties to financial contracting (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Glaeser et al. 2000; Guiso et al. 2009; Mobius and Szeidl 2007) . Third, our findings provide first empirical support for the theoretical notion of generalized vs. limited morality and the complementarity between norms and behavior as the mechanism ameliorating contracting difficulties under asymmetric information (Tabellini 2008) .
Last, we employ codifiable data reflecting actual behavior rather than survey data or data generated by experimental work. Thus, our data are not survey questioners dependent which may be biased and sometimes vague due to poor incentives to reveal true values. 11 In doing so, we provide evidence that social responsibility has an economic payoff, a finding unsupportive of those of Sharfman and Fernando (2008) , who found a neutral relationship between CSR and cost of debt, and of Goss and Roberts (2009) , who find firms with high levels of CSR not to obtain better contractual terms, although those with the worst scores are penalized. Such difference can be explained because these studies have investigated only the borrower side to the loan transaction but have been silent regarding the simultaneous lender's role as emphasized in the present study.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on CSR. Section 3 describes our sample, data, and research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
10 Caillaud and Tirole (2007) focus on the transmission of hard information, where the main interest lies in private communication, and especially in persuasion strategies that transmit information to a selectively chosen subset among several receivers. Karlan (2002) using Peruvian data, finds a positive relationship between proxies for social capital (such as geographic proximity and cultural similarity) and repayment performance. See also Akerlof and Kranton (2000) .
11 See Guiso et al. (2010) for a thorough discussion of value measurement problems in general and in surveys in particular. costs as it prevents opportunistic behavior; (ii) the development of long-term relationships with primary stakeholders like customers, suppliers, communities, and employees, allows firms to expand the set of value-creating exchanges beyond those made through regulated markets (Pfeffer 1998; Prahalad 1994) . In case of financial suppliers, the level of mutual trust and cooperation between the borrowing firm and such stakeholder can affect the firm's financing cost significantly, especially if firms have few suppliers for establishing long-term relationships (Jones 1995) .
II. Corporate Social Responsibility
The second set of arguments supporting a negative association between CSR and cost of capital relies on the external effects citizenship activities have on organizational reputation.
Supporting social responsibility goals helps firms to improve, both, brand and corporate image (Bramer and Pavelin 2006; Rowley and Berman 2000) , which are important elements in the 12 Griffin and Mahon (1997) ; Orlitzky et al. (2003) ; Margolis and Walsh (2003) .
formation of reputation. Beyond achieving a good name for a firm, social responsibility may influence its stakeholders' judgments, which are the foundation of reputation (Fombrun and Shanley 1990) . As corporate reputations are representations of public opinion about a firm, and as such opinions depend on a firm's success in meeting the expectations of those stakeholders, demonstrating a high degree of CSR is a signal that the firm will behave in accordance with stakeholders'
expectations (Bramer and Pavelin 2006) , and the firm's reputation will be augmented (Donaldson and Preston 1995) .
Under conditions of asymmetric information, such as those prevailing in bank lending, firms that are rated as more socially responsible may use CSR disclosures as one of the signals upon which stakeholders base their assessments of corporate reputation. The credibility of this signal is progressively more important for financial institutions, since they often consider qualitative attributes of a firm as proxies for its commitment to repay its debt, and select firms and projects based on these non-financial characteristics (Denis 2004) . Then, firms may engage in visible socially responsible initiatives so as to enhance their reputation and signal debtholders their quality and ability to repay their debts. The outcome is an improvement in the financing conditions of the new loans negotiated with banks (Fombrun 1996) . This theoretical prediction is consistent with the finding that social responsible firms provide more detailed accounting (hard) information (voluntarily disclosed) than less social responsible firms (Gelb and Strawser 2001) .
A final set of arguments associating a borrower's CSR and its financing costs is related to risk management and value generation. The stakeholder literature documents that better social performance improves resource efficiency, which in turn causes an increase in firm's revenues and/or a decrease in its costs. In addition to this direct effect on cash flows, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) have recently suggested that CSR influences financial performance indirectly through the perceived riskiness of a firm's cash flows. Improving CSR can reduce the likelihood that a firm will suffer negative social and environmental disasters that usually give rise to huge compensations and cleanup costs, which make a firm more vulnerable to bankruptcy. Citizenship activities also alleviate other forms of risk for lenders such as changes in legislation or in consumer preferences. Social responsible borrower will have to attend to such changes in order to avoid negative media publicity, protests and consumers' boycotts, which erode firm's legitimacy and reputation and, ultimately, its profitability (Baron 2001; Feddersen and Gilligan 2001; John and Klein 2003) . Furthermore, pursuing a sustainable development strategy implies substantial long-term investment, which cannot be easily reversed and whose results will rarely be reflected in enhanced short-term profits. Hence, the implementation of such strategy requires a credible long-term commitment by the management of not engaging in risky behaviors (Hart 1995 
III. Data description III.A. Data sources
Our sample is composed of borrowers for which we have information on their social responsibility activities, as well as a complete characterization of the syndicated loans in which each borrower participates. Additionally, we have accounting and social responsibility information for the 13 According to this view, managers set on entrenchment have incentives to collude with employees, communities, customers, and suppliers to protect themselves from disciplining mechanisms, causing a subsequent reduction in shareholders' wealth. With the implementation of a social responsible policy managers set on entrenchment retain the confidence of stakeholders who generally acquire certain powers to promote or penalize top executives (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1998; Hellwig 2000; Rowley and Berman 2000) . Then, it will be difficult for displeased shareholders to remove such manager because they would have to face pressure from the non-shareholder stakeholders. Additionally, by colluding with stakeholders, managers reduce firm's attractiveness to potential raiders (Pagano and Volpin 2005) .
banks that lend to these borrowers through syndicated loan arrangements. The information compiled is composed of matching of 4 different databases.
First, for the information on social responsibility, we use the Sustainalytics Platform database. stakeholder disputes. In each of these areas, the information on the various items is translated into a Likert-type scale score. Importantly, each item is sector and time-specific weighted. For example,
-environment‖ is weighted more heavily for energy companies than it is for companies in the financial services industry. The final score provided by Sustainalytics is the sum of each of the scores assigned to the 199 items, averaged by corresponding weight and rated on a scale from 0 (worst) to 100 (best).
The second database is OSIRIS that provides data on financial and ownership structure for borrowers. This is a database compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) and provides information on financial, ownership and earnings for 38,000 companies from over 130 countries.
Third, the LPC Reuters DealScan database provides detailed data on loans made around the world by banks to large firms. Such loan level information includes various characteristics of the loan contracts such as lender and borrower identities, dates of origination, purpose of loan, deal amounts, number of lenders, lender deal share, spread margins, loan maturity, covenants, collateral requirements and borrower's ratings.
Last, bank-level characteristics are collected from the Bankscope database, and matched with the aforementioned loan deal information.
Raw data from DealScan was filtered to allow for only confirmed loans, and to exclude loans made to firms in the financial and public sectors (first digit of SIC code equal to 6 or 9). These loans are dropped because the risks of firms in these sectors are argued to be very different from other firms, as they are likely to be government owned and government protected monopolies (Qian and Strahan 2007 ). For comparability with related studies we take the 15 largest commercial banks or banking holding companies in terms of total assets, in 38 countries (La Porta et al. 1998 ).
Once we have crossed these 4 databases, we are left with an international sample of borrowers and lenders whose distribution by country of origin is shown in Table I . 
III.B. Regression variables
III.B.1. Measuring the CSR of borrowers and lenders, and the cost of debt financing Sustainalytics Platform rating is used to measure lenders and borrowers CSR. In addition to providing a final overall rating, the database provides a score for each stakeholder. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Hillman and Keim 2001), we consider six stakeholder dimensions: community, customers, employees, corporate governance, suppliers, and environment. We therefore measure corporate social responsibility as the weighted sum of scores of these six stakeholder groups, using 15 For example, if firm i receives 1 million in year t through 3 facilities of amounts 0.1, 0.3 and 0.6 million and loan rates of 3%, 4% and 6% respectively; then, we compute the mean rate for firm i in year t as 0.1 3 0.3 4 0.6 6      . We used such procedure to compute annual firm-level values of the different variables of the facility. Finally, for discrete variables like lender's country, we have taken that of the leading bank of the largest deal in the corresponding year.
the corresponding Sustainalytics weights. Note that these dimensions are similar to those of the KLD data (e.g., Goss and Roberts 2009). The outcome is an index that takes values between 0 and 100.
The cost of debt financing is measured using the loan spread in basis points over LIBOR (Cost of Capital) in a log scale. This variable is the weighted average of all loan spreads borne by a borrower in one year, weighted by the corresponding facility amount as a percentage of the total funds raised by the corresponding firm in that year.
III.B.2. Control Variables
We introduce various controls to account for characteristics of the syndicated loan (deal amount, maturity, collateral, and number of lenders), borrowers' characteristics (rating, size, age, profitability, leverage, growth opportunities -market to book-, and ownership structure -blockholder stake), and lenders' characteristics (size, profitability and intangibility). All these variables are defined in Appendix 1.
All variables that capture loan characteristics are aggregated using as weighting scheme the ratio of the corresponding facility amount to the overall facilities amount raised by the corresponding firm in that year.
Deal Amount is the size of the loan. Two effects may explain the effect of this variable on loan spreads. On the one hand, larger loans incentivize borrowers to prospect the syndicated loan market for the best credit conditions (Cerqueiro 2008). On the other hand, larger loans put lender in a risky situation, which will be translated in larger loan spreads.
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Maturity. The -trade-off‖ hypothesis (Gottesman and Roberts 2004) argues that longer maturities imply higher lenders' risk and consequently, lenders will charge higher rates, arguing for a positive relationship between maturity and loan rates. Flannery (1986) argues that sound borrowers would prefer to obtain short-term funds with low rates as a signaling mechanism. Hence, we argue for a positive and monotonic risk-maturity relation.
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Collateral. There are opposing arguments explaining the effect of collateral on loan rates.
The trade-off hypothesis (Gottesman and Roberts 2004) suggests that collateral reduces risk.
However, the -credit quality‖ hypothesis (Dennis et al. 2000) suggest that precisely because credits are risky and have higher rates, lenders require collateral. Also, Cerqueiro (2008) associates high collateral with bad borrowers' quality and finds a positive impact of collateral on loan spreads.
Finally, Manove et al. (2001) find that collateral induces banks to be lazy monitors, ultimately increasing banks' risk.
Number of lenders.
A bank leader in a syndicate bears less risk when there is an increase in the number of participants then, according to the trade-off hypothesis (Gottesman and Roberts 2004 ), lenders will be more prone to offer better financing conditions to borrowers. Also, Gomes and Novaes (2005) , although in a context of banks as shareholders, suggest that the larger the number of lenders, the lower the expropriation incentives of these blockholders, which will translate into lower loan rates.
Borrower Rating. These ratings represent firms' financial strength. The higher the rating, the lower the default probability, and the lower should be the expected loan rate.
Borrower Size. There are two countervailing effects this variable may reflect. On the one hand, larger firms have higher reputation (Diamond 1991) ; have more stable cash-flows and are less opaque and thus have larger bargaining power to obtain better financial conditions (Strahan 1999 ).
On the other hand, large firms may be "too-big-to-fail", generating serious agency problems (moral 17 Some authors (Dennis et al. 2000) document that longer maturity is a signal of good credit quality, which, should be translated in a reduction of the loan rate. Empirically, Berger et al. (2005) , among others, find that risky borrowers use short-term debt, whereas higher credit quality firms use longer maturities. Finally, Diamond (1991) synthesizes both views and predicts a non-monotonic, inversely U-shaped relation between borrower risk and debt maturity. While low risk and the very risky borrowers have short maturities, the medium risk borrowers choose long-term finance.
hazard). The reputation argument would suggest a negative effect of size on loan spreads, while the moral hazard argument, suggests a positive impact.
Borrower Age. This variable is a proxy for reputation (Diamond 1991) , as only the most efficient firms survive in the long run. But also, the moral hazard arguments of too-big-to-fail apply to older firms. Generally older firms may generate serious bad consequences if they fail. Then, they may have incentives to not be excessively diligent in their actions (moral hazard), which will be reflected in higher loan rates. The final result is an empirical issue.
Borrower Profitability. We expect that more profitable firms obtain better financing conditions (Strahan 1999 ).
Borrower Leverage. The standard agency theory (Jensen 1986 ) suggests debt has a positive effect on risk as it reduces agency problems linked to managerial discretion. However, debt also stimulates risk-shifting behavior (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . Then, the final effect on the cost of capital is an empirical issue.
Borrower Market to Book. Such variable is a standard proxy for growth opportunities (Smith and Watts 1992) as well as risky behavior. Growth firms with aggressive investment behavior show larger market to book ratios. Then, the final effect, whether positive, attending to risk considerations, or negative, considering investment patterns, is an empirical issue.
Blockholders Stake. The presence of institutional shareholders has two countervailing effects.
On the one hand, they confer financial soundness onto firms, which should reduce the loan rates. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with yields on public bonds. On the other hand, it is well known (Morck et al. 1988 ) that blockholders tend to expropriate minority shareholders. Hence, lenders may want to be protected against blockholders' expropriating incentives by charging higher rates.
Lender Size. This is a proxy for lenders' bargaining power. The larger the size, the stronger is the power to charge higher rates (Rajan 1992) . However, larger banks can offer a wider amount of services to borrowers and they do not need to demand larger rates in the traditional lending activities for increasing the value generated. Banks approach lending activities as an option to open new business with the firm in the future (Hellmann et al. 2008) . The final effect is an empirical issue.
Lender Profitability is defined as lenders' return on assets. This ratio captures lenders' slack of resources. With larger resources, lenders can afford to offer loans on better terms. To the contrary, more profitable lenders have higher bargaining power and can demand larger spreads because they act as a signaling mechanism for borrower. The final effect is not clear ex-ante.
Lender Intangibility. We include this variable as a proxy for the degree of development in bank monitoring technology (ability to manage soft information). The larger this variable is, the larger is lenders' screening ability for separating good from bad-quality borrowers, which contributes to reduction in loan rates. Goss and Roberts (2009) . This difference in spreads stems from the fact that firms that participate in the syndicate loan market and provide information on social issues are generally high-quality firms. Concerning the other characteristics of the syndicated loans in our sample, the average deal amount is 1,290 million $, collateral requirements affects 11.2% of the borrowers, the average maturity of the loans is 16 months (16.2), and the average number of lenders is more than 14 (14.5). Concerning the social responsibility rating, borrowers' CSR have a lower mean value than lenders' (52 versus 60.4 respectively). Other borrowers' characteristics indicate that size wise, the average borrower has slightly more than 14 billion $ in assets, is 14.5 years old since being listed on the stock market, has a ROA of 13.2%, its leverage is 63.4%, its market-to-book ratio is larger than 4, and the combined stake of its 10 largest block holders is 51.5%. Summarizing, borrowers in the syndicated loan market are large, financially sound, and posses a significant degree of visibility, hence, the potential benefits of CSR as an informative signal for reducing financing costs is conservative to that which may be found for opaque firms. Finally, lenders' characteristics reveal that banks are larger than borrower firms (total assets is more than 20 $ billion), they are more profitable (its ROA is 17.9%) and that their proportion of intangible assets is quite low (0.5%), reflecting their relative specialization in monitoring technology of hard rather than soft information. Table IV presents results from a series of t-tests providing initial evidence of the differences in contract's, borrower's and lender's characteristics once we compare social responsible borrowers with non-social responsible ones in one case, and social responsible lenders with non-social responsible lenders in the other. In both situation we take the mean of the distribution for the corresponding sector and year as the threshold defining whether an organization is social responsible or not. characteristics indicate that those with superior CRS ratings are larger, more profitable and with a larger proportion of intangible assets. The overall emerging picture indicates that CSR dimension seems to be associated with higher quality borrowers and lenders.
III.C. Descriptive statistics

IV. Preliminary evidence
Entries in
In Table V , we provide a contingency analysis of the interaction between borrowers' CSR and lenders' CSR and their effect on the cost of capital. The main result presented in Table V confirms that increases in borrower's CSR and lender's CSR are associated with a reduction of the cost of capital. And, among them, the effect is slightly larger for borrowers'. Note that when lender's CSR is above the mean and there is an increase in borrower's CSR from below to above the mean, loan spreads decrease from 79.9 bp to 62.8 (a difference of 17.1 bp). However, when the change is on behalf of lender's CSR from below to above the mean and borrower's CSR is above the mean, the loan spreads decreases from 74.5 bp to 62.8 (a difference of 11.7 bp). Hence, the difference is almost 50% larger in the case of increases in borrower's CSR rather than in lender's though the emerging picture is one of a decreasing spread when both lenders as well as borrowers are positioned above the mean.
V. The cost of debt financing V.A. Methodology
The baseline model we employ to estimate the association between the cost of debt financing and borrowers' and lenders' CSR, is the following specification (see Berger and Udell 1995; Guedes and Oppler 1996, among (1) that explains loan rates. Such an instrument produces consistent estimates given that, with such prediction, we have eliminated the error term which incorporates the effect of loan rate on the borrower as well as lender social responsibility.
Finally, we study the possible existence of interaction effects between borrowers' CSR and lenders' CSR as stated in Hypothesis 2 using the interaction term Borrower CSR×High Lender CSR that crosses the variable Borrower CSR with the dummy variable High Lender CSR, which is equal to 1 (0) when lenders' CSR is above (below) the sample mean for the corresponding year. profitability are associated with a reduction in loan rates. Also, lender's intangibility, which is related to the existence of more advanced monitoring technology that will facilitate the screening of borrowers, allows lenders to offer better financing conditions as previously discussed. Table VII incorporates the lenders' CSR into the econometric specifications. In column 1, the lenders' CSR is included without interactive terms, while in column 2 it is included as a moderator through the interactive term Borrower CSR×High Lender CSR.
V.B. Results
The results in column 2 indicate that borrowers' CSR has an effect on loan spreads: an increase in one unit in borrowers' CSR is associated with a reduction on 3.14 bp t-statistics = -5.89), however, lenders' CSR has no effect in the loan spreads. Also, lenders' CSR play a moderating role of the effect of borrowers' CSR on loan rates. In particular, when lenders' CSR is above the sample mean, the marginal effect on loan spreads is negative -0.005 (t-statistics = -3.04). Such results indicate that although the main driver in the social responsible realm to obtain better financing conditions is borrowers' social responsible behavior, there is an additional margin for further reduction in the loan rates when lenders are also social responsible institutions (they are above the mean of the distribution, belonging to the limited morality group in Tabellini's (2008) terminology).
Such a result confirms the issue of matching between high borrowers' CSR and high lenders' CSR as the best combination for obtaining the lowest loan spreads. Concerning the control variables, the results are overall consistent with those presented in Table VI ; the only difference is that maturity becomes positive, which is consistent with the largest risks borne by lenders offering longer loan maturities.
VI. Robustness VI.A. Sample selection issues
One of the possible problems in the previous estimation is sample selection bias given that there are borrowers and lenders that participate in the syndicated loan market and are not tracked by Sustainalytics. In order to evaluate and correct for this possible problem if present, we have constructed the corresponding inverse Mills ratio (Heckman 1979 The coefficients of the Mills ratios are insignificant indicating that sample selection bias is not an issue. Thus, as can be expected, the results pertaining to the effect of borrowers' and lenders' CSR on the syndicated loan rates are quite similar to those presented in Table VII that does not include sample selection correction.
VI.B. Endogeneity issues
In Table IX we investigate the possible problem of reverse causality. Such problem has been partially addressed in the previous estimations given that we have used System GMM estimations and advance the dependent variable by one period. We advance in the treatment of the endogeneity problem by incorporating additional instruments on borrowers' and lender's CSR as well as the interaction between them. We take as instruments the prediction of borrowers' and lender's CSR as explained in section V.A. Such (external) instruments complete the internal ones used in System GMM that are the lagged variables up to 3 temporal lags of the potential endogenous variables (Borrower CSR and Lender CSR Considering that the loan mean amount of 1,290 $ million, a borrower that has increased its CSR one standard deviation from the mean of the distribution and that has a social responsible institutions as a lender can save up to 3.33 $ million (the loan rate changes from 4.42% to 4.16%). 23 Overall, results pertaining to the control variables are basically consistent with those found in the previous specifications. However, there are three differences. First, Collateral becomes positive, which is consistent with Cerqueiro et al. (2007) , given that collateral is a signal of bad borrower quality and lenders charge higher loan rates to these firms. 24 Second, the variable number of lenders becomes negative given that more lenders means better risk sharing, which allows lender to offer borrowers better financing conditions (lower cost of capital). Last, lender profitability has a non-positive impact on the cost of capital as sounder lenders can offer borrowers better financing.
25 21 Note that the coefficient of Borrower CSR in column 3 is less negative (-0.035) compared with that documented in Table VIII , (-0.039) . This is consistent with the fact that in Table IX we have addressed to a larger extent endogeneity concerns of reverse causality that associate negatively increases in the cost of capital to reductions in borrowers' CSR investment. The idea is that larger cost of capital means fewer resources to be spent in CSR investments (slack resources hypothesis -Waddock and Graves 1997). Then, once we eliminate this source of negative correlation between Cost of Capital and Borrower CSR, the results should be less negative, as we do find in Table IX . 22 The reduction from the loan rates is of 5.8%, once we take the mean rate of LIBOR for the period 2003-2007, which is 3.63% (0.257/(3.630+0.786) = 0.058). 23 The overall facility volume in 2009 in the syndicate loan market was 2.2 $ trillion according to DealScan database.
Thus, a decrease of 25.66 bp related to an increase in firm's CSR by one standard deviation would lead to an overall average reduction of 563,984 $ million in average total financing cost.
24 Note that the reverse causality effect, which is negative as larger loan rates allows lender to relax collateral requirements, was responsible for the neutral effect of Collateral in the specification in which we have not addressed the endogeneity problems of reverse causality. Once we eliminate the negative reverse causality effect, as presented in Table   IX , the overall effect of Collateral on cost of capital is positive. 25 The reverse causality effect is positive as increases in loan rates enhance lenders' profits. Once this effect is eliminated, the positive effect of lender profitability on the cost of capital found in the previous specifications becomes non-positive (see Table IX ).
VI.C. Missing data
A possible concern is that the missing data in our sample may share a systematic component, resulting in a spurious correlation between borrowers' CSR and loan rates. We have investigated whether those borrowers that present a larger proportion of missing data among the five years of our sample period, present significant differences in the main explanatory variables. We have found (untabulated) that Borrower CSR has a value of 51.95 for the -missing borrowers‖ and a value of 52.01 for the -non-missing borrowers‖ and the difference is not statistically significant. (p-value = 0.99). Similarly, the differences between the cost of capital among both types of firms are only of 2 basis points (p-value = 0.81). Likewise, the values for the variables capturing borrowers' characteristics (size, age, profitability, leverage, market to book, intangibility and blockholders' stake) are not statistically significantly different between the two groups.
Finally, we have reestimated the specifications in Table IX (available upon request) focusing on those borrowers that have less missing observations. The results remain qualitatively unchanged from those found in Table IX . Hence, we can preclude that our results are generated by spurious correlation related to a systematic error in the firm with more missing observations.
VI.D. Non-parametric estimation
As a further robustness test of our results, we employ a non-parametric (distribution free) procedure which is normality-independent. Additionally, the non-parametric estimations may provide more consistent estimates for the variables that are weak predictors (Rubin and Thomas 2000) .
The notion behind the non-parametric procedure is to evaluate, without assumptions on the underlying distribution, the impact on the cost of capital of applying a -shock‖ related to changes in CSR policies once we compare firms with similar characteristics over different variables (e.g. size, age, financial structure, ownership structure). The -shock‖ applied is an increase in borrower's CSR from the first quartile to the last one. In Table X , we show the results of conducting such nonparametric procedure for two different variables that are the cost of capital and investment in the subsequent period. We consider two different situations: First, when lender's CSR is in the first quartile of the distribution (column 1) and, second, when it is in the last quartile of the distribution (column 2). Under both scenarios we apply the aforementioned shock, which is an increase in borrower's CSR from the first quartile to the last quartile of the distribution.
The procedure used for conducting the non-parametric estimation is the Propensity Score
Matching (PSM) estimator of Hirano and Imbens (2004) . We match the observation using all the variables that appear in specification (1) Table X indicate a decrease of 26.9 bp (t-statistic = -4.23) when the shock on borrower's CSR is made among those borrowers whose lender's CSR is in the first quartile of the distribution. When we replicate the shock to borrowers whose lender's CSR is in the last quartile of the distribution we find a decrease in the lending spread of 35.95 bp (t-statistic = -4.50). Thus, we document a marginal reduction of 9 bp in the cost of capital. Hence, the marginal reduction in the loan rate after an increase in borrower's CSR when lenders have social responsible ratings above the average is even larger than the 2.6 bp found when employing the parametric analysis.
It is of interest to investigate whether the reduction in the cost of capital is indeed associated with higher social capital (higher CSR score) as a consequence of reduction in asymmetric information problems or whether it is a strategic move on part of lenders inducing borrowers to take on larger investments related to CSR that may eventually benefit lenders business in the future. In order to discriminate between these alternative explanations, we have conducted a non-parametric estimation on the impact of changes in borrowers' CSR on borrower's investment intensity (defined as the ratio of borrowers' investment to total assets). We show (see Panel B of Table X) , that there is a negative impact on subsequent-period investment (-0.46 and t-statistics = -3.38), when there is a -shock‖ to borrower's CSR -a movement from the first to the last quartile of the distribution-and lender's CSR is in the first quartile. This negative effect is even more pronounced (-0.57 and tstatistics = -2.16), when a lender is highly socially responsible (its CSR is in the last quartile of the distribution). This result confirms the notion that the reduction in the loan spread is not a way for lenders to stimulate borrowers' investment in general and in CSR in particular, in order to gain more future business. The reduction in the cost of capital found can be explained in terms of the amelioration of asymmetric information and monitoring costs as more social responsible borrowers become more trustworthy, particularly when matched with social responsible lenders (familiarity).
Such matching generates social capital. Additionally, we tested and rejected (untabulated) the possibility that our results stem from cultural proximity of lenders and borrowers. 26 Thus, cultural similarities are not the driver of the results.
VII. Conclusion
Provision of external finance is hampered by numerous frictions inherent in capital markets.
As has been previously shown loan rates often exhibit substantial dispersion even after controlling for differences in borrowers, lenders, and markets (Cerqueiro et al. 2007 ) implying that banks price loans in a discretionary manner. We propose several observable and codifiable characteristics representing socially responsible stance of borrowers and lenders that represent such discretionary determinants of the cost of capital. In particular, we show that familiarity as manifested by joint and mutual appreciation of and voluntary investment in social responsibility by both lenders and borrowers can ameliorate the severity of asymmetric information and thus represent a potent explanatory determinant of the reduction in the cost of debt finance. More so, we show that superior (above mean) appreciation of both lenders and borrower along the social responsibility dimension further enhances the reduction in the cost of debt finance.
loan spread of 78.6 basis points) when there is an increase of one standard deviation in borrower's CSR from its mean value. This reduction is further enhanced to 25.7 basis points when lenders are social responsible institutions as well (amounting to 32.6% of the mean spread). Thus, an important contribution of our analysis is to show that borrowers' CSR investment is a particular valuable signal that can trigger steep reductions in the cost of capital if capital providers are able of interpreting such signal in a correct way. This is achieved when capital providers invest in CSR as well. Notes: This table presents the distribution of facilities by borrowers' and lenders' countries. The sample of 12545 facilities is the result of crossing 4 databases: Sustainalytics Platform that provides information on CSR; OSIRIS that provides data on financial and ownership structure for borrowers; LPC Reuters DealScan database provides detailed data on syndicated loans made around the world by banks to large firms; and Bankscope database that provides financial information on banks around the world. Data from DealScan was filtered to allow for only confirmed loans, and to exclude loans made to firms in the financial and public sectors. In the horizontal axis, there is the distribution of facilities by borrowers' country, while in the vertical axis there is the distribution by lenders' country. AT=Austria; AU=Australia; BE=Belgium; BM=Bermudas; BR=Brazil; Islands; CA=Canada; CH=Switzerland; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; ES=Spain; FI=Finland; FR=France; GB=Great Britain; GR=Greece; HK=Hong Kong; IE=Ireland; IT=Italy; JP=Japan; NL=Netherland; NO=Norway; PT=Portugal; SE=Sweden; SG=Singapore; US=USA. We divide the sample in terms of firmlevel observations whose borrowers have scores on CSR above (CSR Borrower=1) or below (CSR Borrower=0) the mean value of the distribution for the corresponding sector and year. Also, we make a second division in terms of lender's CSR averaged by firm-year observation being above (CSR Lender=1) or below (CSR Lender=0) the mean value of the distribution for the corresponding sector and year. The sample is the result to cross 4 databases: Sustainalytics Platform that provides information on CSR; OSIRIS that provides data on financial and ownership structure for borrowers; LPC Reuters DealScan database provides detailed data on syndicated loans made around the world by banks to large firms; and Bankscope database that provides financial information on banks around the world. Data from DealScan was filtered to allow for only confirmed loans, and to exclude loans made to firms in the financial and public sectors. Our sample after crossing the aforementioned 4 databases is a panel composed of 513 firms for the period 2003-2007 and with 2,535 aggregated loans (12,545 facilities). The final number of observations for which we have information on all variables of the specification is 1,568 firm-year observations. We conduct a two-tailed t-test. P-values in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. For sake of comparability, the variables are not presented in a log metric.
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. It adds the spread of the loan with any annual (or facility) fee paid to the bank group. This variable is the weighted average of all loans spreads borne by a borrower in one year, weighted by the facility amount -In DealScan is defined as All-in Spread Drawn. We divide the sample in terms of firm-level observations whose borrowers have scores on CSR above (CSR Borrower=1) or below (CSR Borrower=0) the mean value of the distribution for the corresponding sector and year. Also, we make a second division in terms of lender's CSR averaged by firm-year observation being above (CSR Lender=1) or below (CSR Lender=0) the mean value of the distribution for the corresponding sector and year. The sample is the result to cross 4 databases: Sustainalytics Platform that provides information on CSR; OSIRIS that provides data on financial and ownership structure for borrowers; LPC Reuters DealScan database provides detailed data on syndicated loans made around the world by banks to large firms; Bankscope database that provides financial information on banks around the world. Data from DealScan was filtered to allow for only confirmed loans, and to exclude loans made to firms in the financial and public sectors. Our sample after crossing the aforementioned 4 database is a panel composed of 513 firms for the period 2003-2007 and with 2,535 aggregated loans composed of an average of almost 5 facilities per loan (12,545 facilities). The final number of observations for which we have information on all variables of the specification is 1,568 firm-year observations (around 3 observations per firm during the 5-year period of our sample). We conduct a two-tailed ttest. P-values in parentheses. For the sake of comparability the values are not presented in a log metric. The specification includes dummies of borrowers' and lenders' countries, as well as borrowers' sector and temporal dummies. Cost of Capital is the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down (this variable is defined as All-in Spread Drawn in DealScan). We take this variable in a log scale; Borrower CSR is the Sustainalytics score for borrowers' CSR. Deal Amount is the size of the loan in a log scale; Maturity is the maturity (in months) of the facility in a log scale; Collateral is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the loan requires collateral and zero otherwise; Number of Lenders is the number of financial providers participating in the facility in a log scale; borrower Rating is the Moody's rating on borrowers' riskiness (see the Appendix for details); Borrower Size is the total assets in a log scale; Borrower Age is the number of years since first listed in a log scale; borrower profitability is borrower's operating income divided by total assets; Borrower Leverage is the book value of debt divided by total assets; Borrower Market Book is the Market equity value to equity book value; Borrower Blockholders Stake is the stake of the 10 largest blockholders (%) in a log scale; Lender Size is the total assets in a log scale; Lender Profitability is Lender's operating income divided by total assets; Lender Intangibility is lenders' ratio of intangible assets to the total amount of assets. The Wald test is used as a fitness test. The AR (2) is a test for a second-order serial correlation in the residuals, which is distributed as N(0, 1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. For the Hansen test, the J statistic is distributed as a chi-square under the null hypothesis of instrument validity, that is, no correlation with the error term (p-values reported in parentheses). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively (t-values in parentheses). Notes: The table reports the results of conducting a system GMM estimation on the Cost of Capital. The specification includes dummies of borrowers' and lenders' countries, as well as borrowers' sector and temporal dummies. We also include in the specifications the Borrower and Lender Mills ratio to control for possible sample selection bias related to borrowers and lenders that are tracked by Sustainalytics -see the details of the specification used to construct these variables in the main text. Cost of Capital is the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down (log scale); Borrower CSR is the Sustainalytics score for borrowers' CSR. Lender CSR is the Sustainalytics score for lenders' CSR; Borrower CSR x High Lender CSR is the product of Borrower CSR to High Lender CSR, which is a dummy that is equal to 1 (0) when Lender CSR is above (below) the mean value of the sector for the corresponding year; Deal Amount is the size of the loan in a log scale; Maturity is the maturity (in months) of the facility in a log scale; Collateral is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the loan requires collateral and zero otherwise; Number of Lenders is the number of financial providers participating in the facility in a log scale; borrower Rating is the Moody's rating on borrowers' riskiness (see the Appendix for details); Borrower Size is the total assets in a log scale; Borrower Age is the number of years since first listed in a log scale; borrower profitability is borrower's operating income divided by total assets; Borrower Leverage is the book value of debt divided by total assets; Borrower Market Book is the Market equity value to equity book value; Borrower Blockholders Stake is the stake of the 10 largest blockholders (%) in a log scale; Lender Size is the total assets in a log scale; Lender Profitability is Lender's operating income divided by total assets; Lender Intangibility is lenders' ratio of intangible assets to the total amount of assets. The AR (2) is a test for a second-order serial correlation in the residuals, which is distributed as N(0, 1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. For the Hansen test, the J statistic is distributed as a chi-square under the null hypothesis of instrument validity, that is, no correlation with the error term (p-values reported in parentheses). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively (tvalues in parentheses). Notes: The table reports the results of conducting a non-parametric estimation of changes in the cost of capital as well as in the new investment, when there is a change in Borrower CSR from below the first quartile to the last quartile of the distribution and when this change happens in case that Lender CSR is below (above) the mean as shown in column 1 (column 2). Cost of Capital describes the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. It adds the spread of the loan with any annual (or facility) fee paid to the bank group. This variable is the weighted average of all loans spreads borne by a borrower in one year, weighted by the facility amount (this variable is defined as All-in Spread Drawn in DealScan). New Investment is the ratio of borrowers' investment to total asset lead by one period.
